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Abstract
Straightforward exchange rate arrangements known as currency boards have gained
popularity during the past decade. Among transition economies, Estonia first intro-
duced a currency board in 1992, followed by Lithuania in 1994 and Bulgaria in 1997.
Currency boards have been useful in achieving macroeconomic stabilization, and
they may have helped the Baltics become the first countries of the former Soviet
Union (FSU) to achieve economic growth after the slump in production of the early
1990s. Moreover, Baltic inflation performance has been substantially better than in
other FSU countries. Both in Estonia and Lithuania, the present exchange rate sys-
tem has been accompanied by strong real appreciation of the currency. Both in
Estonia and Lithuania the present exchange rate system has been accompanied by
strong real appreciation of the currency, although it is widely accepted that the
currencies were very much undervalued at the beginning of their pegs. However, if
rapid real appreciation is accompanied with increases in the labor productivity, the
present pegs can be maintained. Banking crises in Estonia and Lithuania have not
been particularly severe, so apparently rigid currency pegs have not been accompa-
nied by excessive financial sector instability. The tight fiscal policies pursued in both
countries, especially Estonia, have been instrumental to the success of these cur-
rency board arrangements.
Keywords: Exchange rate, currency board, Baltic countries
JEL E5, E6, P26
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1 Introduction
This paper examines currency boards in two Baltic countries, Estonia and
Lithuania. Estonia was the first transition economy to introduce a currency
board system in 1992. Disputes still persist as to why Estonia chose a cur-
rency board. While it was initially regarded as a peculiarity, the record now
shows that the currency board arrangement has served Estonia well. Indeed,
few would have expected in June 1992 that the Estonian currency board
would still exist with its original exchange rate of eight Estonian kroons to one
Deutschmark seven years later.
Today, currency boards are no longer regarded historical peculiarities.
Argentina had adopted one even before Estonia. Lithuania, Bulgaria and
Bosnia–Herzegovina have all adopted currency boards, and the pros and cons
of a currency board for Russia and others have been debated. Some experts
argue that that, in the long run, only polar exchange rate regimes – either free
float or a currency board – are feasible. Therefore it is of interest to examine
in detail how long-standing currency boards have worked.
On the basis of experience recently gained, the currency board is at least
an alternative worthy of serious consideration. However, the two Baltic coun-
tries with currency boards, Estonia and Lithuania, are small and little known.
What is their actual experience? Have they managed economic policy better
than, say, Latvia, their common neighbor? Though Baltic countries have dis-
tinct histories, structures and policies, comparing Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia comes about as close to a laboratory experiment as is usually possible in
the social sciences. And if, as is the case in Estonia and Lithuania, a currency
board and good macro performance go hand in hand, is there a causality?
Why does Estonia want to retain the currency board, while Lithuania has
announced it will exit from the arrangement? Can conclusions be drawn for
other countries?
This paper argues that currency boards have increased the credibility of
economic policies by limiting the discretionary powers of monetary authori-
ties. Favorable macroeconomic developments, however, also depend on many
other aspects on economic policymaking. Countries must also make progress
in, for example, corporate restructuring and governance. Thus, merely imple-
menting a currency board does not guarantee higher economic welfare, it
must accompany comprehensive economic reforms. Because of its institu-7
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tional rigidity and credibility the currency board can function as an important
element in these reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we examine the
characteristics of a currency board system and look at the implications it has
for the conduct of economic policies. The third section surveys briefly the
history of currency boards from the 19th century to the present day. In the
fourth section we first look at the monetary reforms in Estonia and Lithuania.
We also assess how currency boards have affected their overall economic
development. The final section offers concluding remarks.
2 Currency board as an exchange rate arrangement
A currency board is an exchange rate arrangement whereby the monetary
authority stands ready to exchange local currency for another (anchor) cur-
rency at a fixed exchange rate without any quantitative limits. The monetary
authority can choose to convert only local currency notes into foreign cur-
rency (as in Hong Kong) or it can also convert the reserve deposits of com-
mercial banks (as in Estonia).1
The commitment to exchange local currency into foreign currency with-
out any limits means that the monetary authority must have sufficient re-
serves to meet even relatively large demand for foreign currency. In practice,
almost all countries that have introduced currency boards have sought to
maintain at least 100% backing of relevant liabilities. Moreover, in some coun-
tries the monetary authority is required by the legislation to keep at least
100% backing. For example, Estonia started with approximately 90% back-
ing, but fairly soon was able to increase the backing to over 100% (Bennett
1992).
The required 100% backing of the monetary base means that the money
supply is almost completely endogenous. Monetary base is determined by the
size of the foreign currency reserves, which in turn depend on the surplus of
the balance of payments. Through this link also larger monetary aggregates
depend on the capital flows. (If the monetary authority has imposed reserve
requirements for commercial banks, it may be able to alter the money multi-
plier by changing the reserve requirements, and have some control over how
the capital flows affect larger monetary aggregates.) A currency board typi-8
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cally assumes completely free capital movements, as it is precisely these
capital movements which respond to changes in money demand.2 Possible
restrictions on capital movements may prevent the currency board from func-
tioning as it should.
A currency board implies a very simple rule in adjusting the monetary
base, and this in turn has usually been the most attractive feature for coun-
tries considering a currency board arrangement. Currency boards have usu-
ally been introduced after severe economic and/or political crises, and in those
circumstances a strict rule-based exchange rate and monetary policy regime
can enhance the credibility of the domestic currency quite rapidly.
However, this credibility is acquired with costs. First of all, the nature of
currency board prevents any large-scale financing of the government’s budget
deficit. In principle, the monetary authority could extend credit to the govern-
ment insofar as it has currency reserves in excess of the minimum required
by legislation. In practice, financing of the public sector is forbidden by legis-
lation in most countries with currency boards. In other words, the government
must finance its possible deficits from other sources, i.e. mainly from domes-
tic and international capital markets. Second, the monetary authority’s ability
to act as a lender of last resort to the banking system is severely restricted
(see Santiprabhob 1997). Analogously with the financing of the government’s
budget deficit, the monetary authority can, in principle, provide liquidity to
distressed banks to the extent that the required backing of the monetary base
is not endangered. However, any large-scale bank rescue operation is bound
to require financial resources from the budgetary authorities. If the source of
a banking system’s difficulties is an external shock, then the absence of lender
of last resort is real economic loss, but if the absence of lender of last resort
gives bank managers and owners incentive to manage their banks more pru-
dently (i.e. reduces the moral hazard problem possible in all types of insur-
ance systems), this might actually be economically more efficient (Fischer
1997). It might even be desirable to have the possible bailout operations ex-
plicitly financed by the budgetary authorities. If the state has entered into an
obligation to maintain the systemic stability of the financial system, then it is
appropriate that the costs are explicitly attributed to the state budget. This
makes the actual costs of such operations more transparent, and increases
the accountability of the policy makers to the public.
If the currency board is perfectly credible, i.e. economic agents attach a
zero probability to abandoning it, interest rates will be the at the same level as
in the country of the anchor currency (barring differences in liquidity9
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between the two markets). If, for some reason, there is an outflow of cur-
rency, the liquidity of the banking system decreases and interest rates in the
interbank market are bid up. If the currency board arrangement is truly cred-
ible, the resulting higher interest rates should attract investments into the country.
When these are channeled to the banking system, its liquidity increases and
interest rates are brought down to the level of the anchor country. In other
words, currency board should work very much like the pre-World War I gold
standard.
The currencies of almost all countries using currency board arrangements
have been pegged to some major international currency. In principle, one
could peg the domestic currency to a currency basket, but in practice this has
not happened.3 It may be that using just a single, well-known international
currency as an anchor enhances the credibility of the chosen exchange rate
regime, insofar as the domestic economic agents can more easily grasp the
connection between the value of the anchor currency and the domestic cur-
rency than between the domestic currency and several other currencies. The
anchor currency has been the US dollar in most cases, although Estonia and
Bulgaria have opted for the German mark.
The main advantage of a currency board arrangement is that it gives
greater credibility to the conduct of exchange rate policy. The fixed exchange
rate can act as a nominal anchor during macroeconomic stabilization (as this
is the reason many currency boards have been introduced), but one can also
claim that it is one way to solve the time inconsistency problem of monetary
policy. If unanticipated monetary policy actions can have real effects in the
short-run, then the monetary authority may be tempted to inflate the economy
to push unemployment below its natural level (or, correspondingly, output over
its long-run potential level). Rational economic agents naturally take this temp-
tation into account in forming their price expectations. In the equilibrium infla-
tion is higher than in the absence of the temptation to inflate and the employ-
ment (and output) are at their long-run levels (Barro & Gordon 1983). If
inflation is deemed socially costly then removing the monetary authority’s
temptation to inflate can be a welfare improvement. A currency board ar-
rangement removes this temptation, as the monetary authority is denied any
independence in monetary policy. Because the monetary base is usually at
least 100% covered by the foreign currency reserves, the probability of specu-
lative attack is also low. If everybody believes that the monetary authority
will defend the external value of the currency even at the cost of high interest
rates, and the currency board arrangement ensures that it will not run out of10
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foreign currency reserves in defending the currency, then the likelihood of a
speculative attack is lower. An alternative view is that currency board is an
institutional solution to a possible disagreement or competition between fiscal
and monetary authorities.
As the currency board arrangements entail both benefits and costs to
economies, it is of interest to study whether economies with currency boards
have performed better than other countries. Ghosh et al (1998) studied the
effects of currency board arrangement on inflation and output in all the mem-
ber countries of the International Monetary Fund between 1970–1996. They
found that countries with currency boards have significantly lower inflation
than countries with floating or conventionally pegged exchange rates. In addi-
tion to this countries with currency boards have lower inflation volatility. Ghosh
et al argue that the lower inflation is the result of lower velocity of money,
which in turn is affected by the confidence of economic agents in the cur-
rency. They interpret this to mean that currency boards are associated with
higher confidence, lower velocity, and thus (for a given rate of money growth)
lower inflation. Countries with currency boards typically also have lower rates
of money growth. In addition to these results concerning inflation in the coun-
tries with currency boards, Ghosh et al find that currency boards are associ-
ated with higher average GDP growth, although this result is not as robust as
the results concerning inflation.
While it seems clear that the theoretical predictions about currency board’s
ability to discipline the authorities and help to solve the inconsistency problem
of monetary policy are supported by empirical evidence, one should remem-
ber that during recent decades, few countries have kept their currency board
arrangement in place for any significant period of time. Thus, empirical re-
sults concerning currency boards must be treated with caution.
3 A short history of currency board arrangements
In the 19th century currency boards were quite common in the British colo-
nies. The first currency board was established in Mauritius in 1849 (Williamson
1995). Eventually, there were over 70 currency boards operating around the
British Empire. By using a currency board arrangement instead of the pound
sterling, colonial governments could keep the seignorage income for them-11
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selves. The reserves held by the currency boards could be deposited to earn
interest (usually in London), and naturally most of the liabilities (notes and
coins) were not interest-bearing.
A number of independent countries introduced currency boards before
the Second World War. For example, Argentina had its first currency board
from 1902 to 1914. Ireland continued to operate a de facto currency board up
to 1970s (Honohan 1994). Ireland simply pegged its currency to the pound
sterling; quite understandable given that Great Britain was by far its most
important trading partner.
After the Second World War, many colonies gained independence, and in
most instances the authorities of the newly independent countries felt that a
currency board was not the most appropriate monetary and exchange rate
arrangement. The ability to pursue independent monetary and exchange rate
policies was deemed important for achieving economic growth, and since
currency board arrangement means that exchange rate or interest rate could
not be used as an active instrument in macroeconomic policy, a more flexible
exchange rate arrangement was desired.
One could argue that the first modern currency board was introduced in
Hong Kong in 1983. Hong Kong reintroduced a currency board arrangement
after a period of heightened instability in the foreign exchange market. (For
an assessment of Hong Kong’s currency board see Kwan & Lui 1996). In
the Hong Kong regime, the Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the US dollar
and bank notes were issued by three commercial banks. The commercial
banks in turn had to submit US dollars of at least equal value to the Exchange
Fund in exchange for Certificates of Indebtedness. Over the years Hong
Kong moved away from pure currency board arrangement. In 1988, the Hong
Kong Exchange Fund acquired the right to conduct open-market operations.
In 1990, it gained the right to issue treasury bills (Williamson 1995). This has
prompted some analysts to doubt whether Hong Kong actually has a cur-
rency board. Even so, Hong Kong maintained its strict peg to the US dollar.
The peg has survived the transfer of the political power to the People’s Re-
public of China and the recent turbulence in the world financial markets,
although the interest rate spread between Hong Kong and United States has
been quite wide at times.
The next country to introduce a currency board arrangement was Argen-
tina in 1991. In Argentina, the currency board was introduced after a severe
bout of hyperinflation. It is perhaps not too surprising that the Argentine pub-
lic was ready to give up the discretionary powers of the monetary authority12
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and to commit to a simple rule-based monetary policy. Introduction of the
currency board was very successful in reducing inflation.
During the 1990s, currency boards have been introduced in several tran-
sition countries, i.e. countries in process of transforming their economies from
a largely command-based system to a market-oriented system. The first tran-
sition country to introduce a currency board arrangement was Estonia in June
1992. Estonia was followed by Lithuania in April 1994 and Bulgaria in June
1997. The former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina also introduced
a currency board amidst grave political difficulties. Most transition countries
have introduced a currency board in response to severe macroeconomic im-
balances. The one possible exception is Lithuania where the external value of
currency had been stabilized before the currency board was implemented.
There, the authorities were concerned that unless a more binding commit-
ment to the fixed exchange rate was introduced, there would be an over-
whelming pressure on fiscal policy that would force the central bank to fi-
nance at least part of the resulting deficit (Camard 1996).
During the recent financial crises, currency boards have often been pro-
posed as a remedy, but so far no large country besides Argentina has intro-
duced a currency board. This may have something to do with the classical
argument that favors fixed exchange rates for open economies. Small econo-
mies are also more likely to be open, so currency boards may be more suit-
able for them.
4 Currency boards in the Baltic countries
4.1  Monetary reforms in Estonia and Lithuania
The three Baltic countries regained their independence from the Soviet Union
in the latter half of 1991. Lithuania was the first Baltic country to declare its
independence, but Latvia and Estonia soon followed. Economic reforms ac-
tually began in the Soviet Union at the end of 1980s, and these reforms were
implemented throughout the Baltics. The first commercial bank in the Soviet
Union was established in Estonia in 1989 (Korhonen 1996).13
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One important component in the economic reforms of the Baltic coun-
tries was currency reform.4 At the start of 1992 most prices were freed in
Russia, and monthly inflation quickly jumped to over 30% as prices rose to
eliminate the monetary overhang.5 After the first initial change in the price
level, the monthly inflation was approximately 10% during the first half of
1992. In June, the monthly inflation rate jumped to almost 30% and stayed
there for almost five months. Naturally, the external value of ruble depreci-
ated strongly during this period. During the first half of 1992, the Baltic coun-
tries were still part of the ruble area. The apparent instability of the ruble
prompted them to look for alternative monetary arrangements. In addition,
the three newly independent countries wanted to assert their independence in
the monetary sphere.
Ultimately, all Baltic countries chose a fixed exchange rate regime. Esto-
nia was first, followed by Latvia and Lithuania. In Latvia and Lithuania, the
pegging of the currencies was preceded by what might be described as a
managed float.
Why would a country choose to give up exchange rate as a policy instru-
ment and opt for a regime of fixed exchange rate? The analytical literature on
the desirability of fixed exchange rates can be said to begin with Mundell
(1961). It is generally agreed (e.g. Isard 1995 and the references therein)
that when countries are more open to foreign trade, they have more to gain
from fixed exchange rates. In an open economy, changes in exchange rate
translate quickly into changes in nominal wages and prices, and thus exchange
rate policy is not very effective in maintaining external balance. At the same
time, movements in exchange rate threaten the domestic price stability. One
could argue that smaller countries are natural candidates for fixed exchange
rate as they are more likely to be more open to international trade. The cur-
rency of a very small country may not be very effective in the traditional
functions of money, i.e. as a unit of account and medium of exchange. For the
currency of a very small country, a fix to more widely known currency could
enhance its usefulness in the aforementioned functions.
Baltic economies are tiny. The annual nominal GDP in 1998 was approxi-
mately $5.2 billion in Estonia, $6.4 billion in Latvia and $10.7 billion in Lithua-
nia. These economies are also extremely open. The combined value of ex-
ports and imports in 1998 were 125% of GDP in Estonia, 81% in Latvia and
93% in Lithuania. Additionally, imports and exports of services are important
for all Baltic countries. Therefore one could argue that the small Baltic coun-
tries are natural candidates for fixed exchange rates.14
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If a group of countries generally face dissimilar real shocks, then fixing
their currencies will entail larger economic costs than letting the currencies
float. A flexible exchange rate can shield a country from nominal shock origi-
nating from abroad, but a fixed regime can stabilize the effects of a domestic
nominal shock. However, given the short time the Baltic countries have been
independent and the immense structural change they have gone through, it is
impossible to say even with the customary low degree of confidence how
shocks to Baltic countries will correlate with shocks in other countries (for
example, the EU and the euro area economies) in the future. Furthermore,
separating nominal from real shocks is very difficult at this stage. Thus we
have to rely on cruder measures of integration. One could argue that as Baltic
countries are well integrated with the European Union via trade links, their
economic development would be closely integrated as well.
Another factor favoring the adoption of fixed exchange rate in the Baltic
countries was the widespread dollarization of the economies at the beginning
of transition. When an economy is dollarized to a large extent, a fixed ex-
change rate may be preferable. Sudden changes in transaction use of domes-
tic and foreign currency may produce large swings in the exchange rate.
Demand for domestic money will also be more sensitive to the expected
opportunity cost of holding it. In these circumstances, fixing the exchange
rate can be very helpful in stabilizing the economy. In both Lithuania and
Estonia the ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money (which is one
commonly used measure of dollarization) was over 20% at the time the cur-
rency board was introduced (IMF 1999). After stabilization, this ratio de-
clined in Estonia because residents were temporarily forbidden from opening
new foreign currency deposits. Currently, the ratio of foreign currency de-
posits to broad money is roughly 25%. In Lithuania this ratio has remained
fairly high throughout the transition and stands currently at about 25%.
Choosing a regime of fixed exchange rate is not without risks. For exam-
ple, the fixed exchange rate can become overvalued. If wage growth ex-
ceeds the growth in productivity for an extended period, domestic producers
will lose their competitiveness in export markets. If nominal wages are inflex-
ible downwards, then the fastest way to change real wages and restore inter-
national competitiveness is to devalue the currency.
Wages could rise exceptionally fast from large capital inflows, causing a
boom in domestic lending that inflates the value of assets in the economy and
creates a large increase in domestic demand. Capital flows could increase
because of financial deregulation as has happened in many countries. If capi-15
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tal flows stop or even reverse and if domestic prices and wages do not adjust
downwards, a country might either need to adjust its exchange rate or face an
economic downturn. Volatility in asset prices can also cause problems in the
banking sector if banks are exposed to asset prices, either directly or through
their loan customers. In principle, these problems can be countered with pru-
dent economic policies, e.g. good supervision of banks and tight fiscal policy,
but in practice policymakers often find it difficult to response in advance to
imbalances.
The Baltic countries and especially Estonia can also be used as an exam-
ple of this sort of asset bubble. In 1997, equity and real estate prices rose
rapidly until September, after which for example the Tallinn Stock Exchange’s
TALSE index decreased 81% by end-1998. So far, at least, Estonia’s cur-
rency board and fixed exchange rate appear to have withstood the different
stages of economic cycle. In Lithuania, the inflow of foreign capital was
never as pronounced as in Estonia, so the increases and decreases in asset
prices were never as large.
4.1.1 Estonia
Estonia was the first Baltic country to introduce its own currency, the kroon.
After deliberations the Estonian authorities decided to adopt a currency board
system. This was regarded as a quick way to gain confidence in the currency.
minimum reserve requirements for commercial banks, something not in ac-
cordance with the strictest interpretations of a currency board system.6 In
any case, foreign currency reserves must at all times cover the currency in
circulation and the deposits of commercial banks at the central bank (in  prac-
tice Bank of Estonia has kept the reserve coverage usually at around 110%).
These laws define the Estonian currency board and its operating procedures.
Estonia didn’t adopt the strictest possible version of a currency board as the
Bank of Estonia has some discretion as to how much of the capital inflows
etary and exchange rate policy. These were the currency law, the law on
are allowed to boost the monetary base. The Bank of Estonia has also kept
This consideration weighted quite heavily in the case of Estonia, which was
starting a completely new currency in a complex and fragile economic and
political situation.
In May 1992, the Estonian parliament passed three laws regarding mon-
backing of Estonian kroon, and the foreign exchange law (Eesti Pank 1992).16
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The Estonian kroon was pegged to German mark at rate 1DEM = 8EEK
when the currency reform was carried out in June 1992. Estonia received its
pre-war gold reserves (either as gold or foreign exchange) from Bank of
England and other central banks. These reserves then formed the initial back-
ing for the kroon (Bennett 1992).
Chart 4.1 Monthly inflation rates in the Baltic countries
From the beginning, the kroon was totally convertible for current account
purposes. The Bank of Estonia demanded that exporters surrender their ex-
port earnings within two months, but it is not clear how strictly this was imple-
mented. Currency deposits were allowed, but no new currency deposits were
opened. Once this regulation was repealed in March 1994, Estonia essentially
had achieved full convertibility of its currency and virtually free movement of
capital.7 The exchange rate arrangement was quite successful in bringing
inflation initially down, especially when compared to other countries of the
former Soviet Union, including the other two Baltic countries. Chart 4.1 shows
the monthly inflation rates for the three Baltic countries from June 1992 to
December 1994. One can see how Latvia and especially Estonia succeeded
in bringing inflation down fairly quickly, but Lithuania struggled considerably
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are keenly interested in macroeconomic stability, so Estonia’s currency board
regime greatly contributed to this in the early years of transition.
4.1.2 Lithuania
Like Latvia, Lithuania opted for a more gradual approach to monetary re-
form. The Lithuanian parliament accepted a law on national currency already
in December 1991, but political debates about the new currency prevented
Lithuania from leaving the ruble zone for quite some time. In May 1992, the
Lithuanian authorities introduced an interim currency. It was simply called
the “coupon”, talonas in Lithuanian. The talonas was originally issued at par
with the Russian ruble. In September, the authorities began to withdraw ru-
bles from circulation, and from the beginning of October use of the ruble was
forbidden. In June 1993, the authorities announced the introduction of a new
currency, the litas. After July, the talonas ceased to be legal tender and the
use of foreign currencies was banned. The litas was convertible for current
account purposes, but Lithuania has retained more restrictions on capital ac-
count transactions than the other two Baltic countries.
In its early economic reforms, Lithuania differed from the other Baltic
countries in its exchange rate arrangement. Lithuania had a dual exchange
lowering inflation is possible with more conventional exchange rate arrange-
ments, although the shift in the price level during the latter half of 1992 was
clearly larger in Latvia. Although the Latvian currency (first the Latvian ruble
and then the lats) was floated at its introduction to spring 1994, the central
bank found itself regularly intervening in the market. In spring 1994, the lats
was pegged to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the IMF.
Further evidence of the credibility of Estonia’s new exchange rate regime
can be gleaned from capital movements after the introduction of the new
currency. During the latter half of 1992, the Bank of Estonia’s foreign assets
increased by $135 million. As this was partly caused by restoration of pre-
war gold, it cannot be treated as a sign of increased confidence. During 1993,
however, the foreign assets of the Bank of Estonia increased by $133 million,
almost 6% of 1993 GDP. Partly this inflow of capital can be explained by the
privatization method chosen in Estonia, where many companies were sold on
cash-basis to foreign investors. This took place mainly between November
1992 and November 1994 (Korhonen et al 1999). Naturally foreign investors18
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rate system until autumn 1993. As a result of lax monetary policy (for exam-
ple, between the first quarter of 1993 and the first quarter of 1994 the mon-
etary aggregate M1 rose by 134%), inflation in Lithuania was considerably
higher than in Estonia or Latvia. High inflation was naturally reflected in the
external value of Lithuanian currency: the talonas depreciated markedly against
the dollar up until summer of 1993, after which the tighter monetary policy
succeeded in stopping the depreciation and the litas actually appreciated some-
what. Inflation came also drastically down during the summer, although there
was a clear rebound in the monthly inflation towards the end of 1993.
Partly because of the observed volatility of the exchange rate and the low
credibility of the monetary policy debate about the appropriate exchange rate
regime intensified in autumn 1993. As a result of these discussions, Lithuania
decided to adopt a currency board in March 1994. The new arrangement
became effective in April, when the litas was pegged to the US dollar at a
rate of 1USD = 4LTL. Even after the introduction of currency board, Lithua-
nia continued to experience higher inflation than Estonia or Latvia, although
Lithuania’s inflation is currently as low as Latvia’s.
The inflow of capital into Lithuania after the introduction of the currency
board was as high as in Estonia’s, relative to the size of the economy. In 1994,
the foreign assets of the Bank of Lithuania increased by $180 million, or
almost 7% of GDP in 1994. If capital inflows are positively correlated with
investor confidence in the economic policies of a given country, then the new
foreign exchange rate regime in Lithuania seems to have been associated
with increase in the credibility of the economic policies.
4.2  The macroeconomic effects of the Baltic currency boards
In this section we inspect the macroeconomic effects of currency board ar-
rangements in the Baltic countries. The most interesting question is whether
the countries with currency boards have better macroeconomic performance
than countries with other types of exchange rate arrangements.
The success of particular polices can naturally be evaluated with many
different indicators, but here I concentrate mainly on inflation and output.
Inflation is relevant, because we are assessing the performance of a mon-
etary policy rule. However, output is also an important indicator of the suc-
cess of economic policies, because it is closely correlated with welfare.19
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Currency boards have been usually used to achieve quick stabilization in
a situation of severe economic (and possibly political) imbalances. In this
respect currency boards have performed very well in Estonia and Lithuania.
As was seen in the section 4.1.1, the initial stabilization was achieved rapidly
in Estonia. In Lithuania, the currency board arrangement has also been asso-
ciated with a steady slowing of inflation. It is clear that currency boards have
helped to bring inflation down, and this in turn may have had positive effect on
output growth. In reducing inflation further, the track record of currency boards
in the Baltic countries is mixed. For example, Latvia has been able to reduce
its annual inflation to below three per cent (at least for the time being) without
a currency board.8
One important macroeconomic effect of the currency boards has been
their disciplinary effect on public finances. As a currency board prohibits
central bank financing of the public sector deficit, it can probably be credited
with the relatively low deficits in Lithuania and Estonia. (Also here one should
remember that Latvia has been able to maintain low deficits without a cur-
rency board. In Estonia, the central government is forbidden from making a
budget with a deficit.) However, when assessing the effects of currency
boards, one is confronted with the problem of direction of causality. Did Esto-
nia have low public deficits because it was constrained by the currency board
arrangement or did the Estonian authorities deliberately seek low deficits? It
seems that the Estonian authorities have been very consistent in their chosen
economic policies. After regaining independence, Estonia has had one of the
most liberal foreign trade regimes in the world, and so far there have been no
serious attempts inside the political system to change this. Furthermore, one
would be hard-pressed to find a politician who opposes the currency board
arrangement, which is very much seen as a cornerstone of economic policy.
This widespread support for the currency board arrangement has clearly in-
creased its credibility. In Lithuania the support for currency board has been
somewhat less enthusiastic, see for example Camard (1996) on the discus-
sions concerning the introduction of currency board.20
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Chart 4.2 Annual inflation in the Baltic countries
4.2.1 Inflation
The Baltic countries were the fastest among all former Soviet Union coun-
tries to reduce inflation. In Estonia, inflation is currently somewhat higher
than in the other two Baltic countries, but still in single digits. Chart 4.2 shows
the annual inflation in the Baltic countries from the beginning of 1995 to the
end of 1998. It can be seen that Latvia has had the lowest annual inflation for
some time now. Lately inflation has partly been fuelled by the administra-
tively set prices in all Baltic countries, as their price increases have been
deliberately spread over a prolonged period of time. Inflation in internationally
tradable goods has usually been several percentage points lower than the
headline inflation, although during 1998 the headline inflation declined to low
single-digits.
What has the role of currency board been in reducing inflation in the
Baltic countries? In Section 4.1.1 it was mentioned that in Estonia slowing of
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despite the fact that the international reserves of Bank of Estonia grew, which
naturally meant that also the monetary base was growing. Ghosh et al (1998)
found that in countries with currency boards, the growth in money was on
average lower than in other countries, but that those countries had also saw
slower growth in the velocity of money.9 They termed the effect currency
boards have had on the rate of money growth “discipline effect” and its ef-
fects on velocity as the “confidence effect.” Table 4.1 presents calculated
annual changes in velocity and money supply10 in the Baltic countries and
several other transition economies between 1993 and 1997.  In Latvia and
Lithuania, the data starts from 1994, as their national currencies were not
introduced until 1993.
The change in velocity is calculated from the identity:
Where ∆ v is the change in velocity, ∆ p+∆ y the change in nominal gross
domestic product and ∆ m the change in the aforementioned monetary aggre-
gate. The Table 4.1a shows first that in Estonia and Lithuania velocity growth
has been lower on average than in many other transition economies. It is not
surprising that Estonia and Lithuania have had lower velocity growth than
countries like Russia and Bulgaria where inflation has been high and variable
during transition. In Estonia and Lithuania, velocity growth has also been
lower than in Hungary and Czech Republic, which have not experienced
episodes of extremely high inflation during the period in question. One should
note Latvia’s case here. In Latvia, the change in velocity is in line with the
experience in the other two Baltic countries, so by this criterion the “confi-
dence effect” has been at least as high in Latvia. One can speculate that at
least in Latvia this apparent credibility in the currency and by extension mon-
etary policy has been result of an independent central bank, which has dem-
onstrated its preference for fixed exchange rate and low inflation.11 The av-
erage growth in money supply has been quite high both in Estonia and Lithua-
nia. In a currency board system large capital inflows translate into growth of
the monetary base which in turn leads to expansion in the larger money ag-
gregates. Here it is interesting to note that Latvia has had clearly lower growth
rate of money than Estonia or Lithuania. In Latvia, the central bank has used
its power to affect monetary base and ultimately inflation, but apparently to
m y p v ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆22
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reach lower inflation rather than boost domestic demand. Here one can also
speculate what the effect of Bank of Latvia’s independence has been on the
conduct of monetary policy. Loungani & Sheets (1997) found that central
bank independence in negatively correlated with average inflation rate also in
the transition economies, i.e. similar result as in many studies concerning
OECD countries. This result persists even after controlling for the stance of
fiscal policy and initial conditions.
Table 4.1a Changes in velocity 1993–1997
Table 4.1.b Changes in money supply 1993 –1997
Source: International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Russia
1993 -10.0 % 11.7 % 30.0 % 7.7 % -26.7 % 13.1 %
1994 12.9 % 6.0 % 2.9 % 19.7 % -27.2 % 13.0 % -3.4 % 26.0 %
1995 4.1 % 13.2 % 1.3 % 12.0 % 9.6 % 19.5 % 0.6 % 15.9 %
1996 -1.6 % 1.3 % 23.5 % -9.9 % 8.1 % 2.3 % -10.6 % 7.7 %
1997 1.2 % -17.0 % -14.9 % 1.0 % 15.0 % -1.0 % -1.8 % -6.1 %
Average 1.3 % 0.9 % 3.2 % 6.9 % 7.1 % 8.3 % -8.4 % 11.3 %
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Russia
1993 61.7 % 27.9 % -13.0 % 11.0 % 27.2 % 206.9 %
1994 18.8 % 27.1 % 34.8 % 41.4 % 40.7 % 7.7 % 33.4 % 101.0 %
1995 25.5 % 0.8 % 34.2 % 35.0 % 6.5 % 5.7 % 31.0 % 79.5 %
1996 27.0 % 17.2 % 3.5 % 78.5 % 4.6 % 18.3 % 33.5 % 25.0 %
1997 20.4 % 29.6 % 34.4 % 227.0 % -7.6 % 20.4 % 22.2 % 22.9 %
Average 30.7 % 18.7 % 26.7 % 82.0 % 6.2 % 12.6 % 29.5 % 87.1 %23
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4.2.2 Output
All transition economies started their transformation towards more market-
based economy with a large drop in output. Some have claimed that overtly
tight monetary and fiscal policies were behind this drop of output, but when
one considers the wide variety of policy stances in the Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) and in the former Soviet Union (FSU) it becomes evident that
the output drop cannot be explained by the conventional demand-manage-
ment arguments. Gomulka (1998) argues that large supply and demand side
shocks caused e.g. the output fall. The old economic system produced goods
that consumers were not willing to buy, and thus reallocation of resources
was needed. Because this cannot be accomplished very fast, output will con-
tract before expanding again. In addition to this the old trade ties between
different companies were severed as the central planning broke down, and it
took time for companies to find both new customers and suppliers.
















Currency boards in the Baltic countries: What have we learned?
BOFIT Discussion Papers  6/1999 Institute for Economies in Transition
Iikka Korhonen
In all the countries of former Soviet Union the output contraction has been
very large, in many cases over 50% of the output level at the beginning of
transition. Even if one takes into account the fact that at the start of transition
the statistics probably overstated the level of production and after the start of
the transition they failed to take into account much of the new private sector,
the drop in output is sizable. In Latvia and Lithuania the output collapse in
1992 was even larger than in Russia or Ukraine, although subsequent eco-
nomic performance has been considerably better. In Estonia the initial output
drop was not larger than other countries of former Soviet Union, even though
the monetary and fiscal policies were obviously tighter than in most other
countries. The Baltic countries were the first among FSU countries to expe-
rience GDP growth. In this sense the currency board arrangements are at
least correlated with relatively good economic performance. Chart 4.3 shows
the level of GDP in the Baltic countries, Russia and Ukraine from 1991 to
1998.
However, currency board (and monetary policy in general) is obviously
just one part of the economic policy package. Can currency board be attrib-
uted with this early resumption in growth? Early studies concerning output
decline and growth in the transition economies have usually argued that growth
in the transition economies seems to have restarted only after the annual
inflation rate has been pushed to low double digits. Excessive inflation rates
are detrimental to growth, as they make the economic environment generally
more uncertain. Insofar as currency boards have helped to reduce inflation,
they have had a positive effect on the level of economic activity.
Once the initial decline in output was halted, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia
began to post respectable GDP growth figures. The Baltic growth pattern
compares to the Polish experience after its initial output decline had ended,
although since the Russian crisis Baltic economic growth has faltered. Esto-
nia and Lithuania have implemented a host of economic policies conducive to
growth. In both countries the structural reforms progressed quite rapidly, es-
pecially in comparison to the other FSU countries. Most reforms were in
taken quite early in the transition process. Taking the EBRD’s average of the
transition indicators12 for 1994 as a proxy for progress in transition as of mid-
1994, Estonia (with Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic) would rank near
the top, right behind the Czech Republic. Lithuania is also close behind. Moreo-
ver, both countries have maintained liberal foreign trade regimes, which have
fostered growth in exports and stimulated efficiency in the economy. Here
one could argue that currency boards have influenced policymakers, as a25
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poses a liberal foreign trade regime, but having a currency board is not a
necessary condition for having a liberal foreign trade regime. For example,
Latvia introduced full current account convertibility in June 1994, only a month
later than Lithuania.
The favorable development of output in Estonia and Lithuania has not
been sufficient to prevent a clear increase in unemployment. This is in line
with the experience in many other transition economies, where rapid reforms
increase unemployment at first as companies shed excess labor. Unemploy-
ment among the Baltic countries has been the highest in Estonia, where the
unemployment rate (ILO definition) rose to 10% in 1995 and has remained
approximately at that level ever since. In Lithuania (and Latvia) the unem-
ployment rate has been lower, but the economic crisis in Russia certainly
increased unemployment, especially in Latvia. It is of considerable interest to
what extent the existing unemployment can be considered structural; i.e. can
conventional macroeconomic policies reduce the unemployment. Kuddo (1998)
argues that a large portion of labor force in the Baltic countries (as well as in
other transition economies) is “functionally illiterate”, i.e. does not have the
skills needed in a market economy. There is very little training and retraining
for people in the labor force. This would imply that structural unemployment
is actually quite high. On the other hand, the labor markets in the Baltic coun-
tries are very liberal. Wage setting is decentralized, so this should provide a
buffer against external shocks. There is some anecdotal evidence that wages
have already reacted to the recent Russian crisis in Estonia. Another possible
explanation for high unemployment is the large Russian minority in Estonia
(and Latvia). If this minority is discriminated against in the labor market as
various reports claim, this could explain a large observed unemployment. (In
Estonia, ethnic Russians make up approximately one third of the population;
in Latvia, almost half.)
4.3  The Baltic currency boards and financial systems
One criticism against currency boards has been their inability to function as
lenders of last resort in the case the banking sector experiences liquidity prob-
lems. It is at least theoretically possible that this might lead to more volatile
development of the banking sector, and perhaps more banking failures than
currency board requires free movement of capital. This naturally presup-26
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the more conventional central bank model. However, in transition economies
the number and scope of banking failures seem to be largely uncorrelated
with the type of exchange rate regime chosen, and at least there is no evi-
dence that countries with currency boards have less stable financial systems.
In the early stages of transition, many banking problems were caused by an
outstanding stock of bad debts inherited from the era of command economy.
In addition to this, the new banks starting were often undercapitalized and did
not have the experience necessary to conduct prudent banking operations.
Insufficient banking regulations and supervision aggravated the problems.13
Table 4.2 Number of banks at year-end
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
1992 43 52 27
1993 22 61 27
1994 22 55 27
1995 16 40 16
1996 15 33 12
1997 12 31 11
1998 6 28 12
Source: Fleming et al (1996) and national central bank publications
Table 4.2 shows the evolution of the number of banks in the three Baltic
countries (including branches of foreign banks). The number of banks has
decreased clearly, but most of this decline has been achieved through merg-
ers, not involuntary closures or bank failures. However, banking crises have
taken place in all the Baltic countries. There were bank closures and
recapitalizations by authorities in Estonia in 1992, 1994 and finally in 1998.
Lithuania experienced a banking crisis at the end of 1995. The losses to de-
positors have usually been minimal, except in the Latvian banking crisis of
1995, where the negative net worth of the largest bank was found to be $32027
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million or approximately 7% of GDP. This bank failure was partially caused
by a fraud, but also poor control of currency and interest rate risks (Fleming
et al 1996). It is most probably a coincidence that the largest bank failure in
the Baltic countries took place in the one Baltic country which did not have a
currency board in place, but this illustrates well that at least so far many other
factors have affected banking systems more than the choice of exchange
rate regime.
In its strictest interpretation, a currency board prevents monetary authori-
ties from doing anything when banks are facing difficulties. In practice, the
monetary and fiscal authorities in Estonia and Lithuania have been able to
intervene when individual banks are in distress. Both in Estonia and Lithua-
nia, the central banks have held the currency reserve backing the monetary
base well over 100%, which has given them valuable leeway in dealing with
banking sector problems. According to Fleming et al (1996), the Estonian
monetary authorities have provided short-term liquidity support (e.g. Social
Bank in 1994) and taken over banks and recapitalized them (North Estonian
Bank in 1994). In 1998, the Bank of Estonia made two small banks merge and
became the majority shareholder in the new bank.
During the Lithuanian banking crisis in 1995, the Bank of Lithuania pro-
vided some liquidity support for a small bank (Aura Bank) that had run into
difficulties. However, central bank’s resources turned proved inadequate when
the largest private bank (Innovation Bank) and two other banks also got into
trouble. At that point, the Lithuanian parliament passed a law requiring the
government to extend guarantees for interbank borrowing by troubled banks.
Apparently, when the problems are large enough or systemic in nature in the
banking sector of a country with a currency board system, government inter-
vention is inevitable.
4.4  Assessing the Baltic currency boards
It is obvious that the Baltic countries have been able to manage economic
transition more successfully than other former Soviet Union republics. They
also appear to be more successful in transition then, for example, Romania
and Bulgaria. Initial conditions can explain some of the differences between
economic performance, but naturally the policies chosen are also important.28
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In any case, the effects of initial conditions should diminish as time passes, so
the effect of policies should increase.
When one examines the evidence from the different transition econo-
mies, it is clear that having a currency board does not produce (or at least has
not produced so far) poorer economic performance than other exchange rate
regimes. Estonia had the smallest output decline of all FSU countries, and it
and Lithuania have posted very high average growth figures since the initial
output collapse halted. However, one can hardly claim that currency board is
a necessary condition for favorable economic development. Poland and Latvia
exhibited high GDP growth after the transformational recession, although in
Latvia the resumption of growth was delayed by approximately one year
because of the failure of country’s largest bank as well as several smaller
ones. (These failures wiped out over a third of household deposits.)
As is the case with growth, it is hard to argue that having a currency
board has been a necessity for reducing inflation to low double or even single
digits in transition economies. Almost all countries in Central and Eastern
Europe have managed to get inflation below 20%. Latvia recently posted the
lowest inflation of all transition economies. On the other hand, it is hard to see
how Bulgaria could have reduced inflation as successfully as it did without
the added credibility of a currency board.
If currency boards have not been absolutely necessary for resumption of
growth and achieving lower inflation, why have the authorities in different
countries implemented them? Why would a monetary authority wish to tie its
own hands? There clearly are some costs associated with losing the ability to
conduct monetary policy, so what can the benefits be?
Because all Baltic countries are small and open to international trade,
conventional analysis would suggest that they would benefit from having a
fixed exchange rate. As currency boards are probably the most credible form
of fixed exchange rates, perhaps it is not so surprising that they have been
adopted in two of the three Baltic countries.
Estonia introduced its currency board and a completely new currency
shortly after regaining political independence. In these circumstances, the
currency board was seen as the quickest way to achieve credibility for the
currency. This is indeed what happened. Capital inflows to the country started
almost immediately after the introduction of the currency board, and this in a
situation where the currency had no history and the new monetary authority
no reputation or even experience. Despite all this, the new currency was
readily accepted as a medium of exchange (see Lainela & Sutela 1994). Both29
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the inflow of capital and public’s willingness to hold the new currency were
clear signs of the credibility of the new currency.
However, the introduction of currency board was only one part of a com-
prehensive reform package in Estonia. This package was designed to create
a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment, to better enable the
private sector to function and grow. Other important part of the package was
fiscal policy, where the Estonian government has been more or less able to
maintain balance of the central government budget, and even the deficits of
the enlarged government have been very small, no more than 1.5% of GDP.
This reasonably tight fiscal stance (tight, at least in comparison with most
countries) has also meant that government has not suffered from the need to
make the monetary authorities finance the deficit. On the other hand, it could
be argued that the unavailability of such financing contributed to fiscal re-
straint. The third part of the package was the extremely liberal trade policy,
which probably helped to improve efficiency in the economy and promote
exports. As the currency board arrangement is legislatively difficult to
change,14 it may be seen as the cornerstone of this policy package. Still, its
importance should not be overplayed.
Lithuania introduced the litas only in August 1993. Moreover, the decision
to introduce currency board was not unanimous; even the central bank ar-
gued against such move (Lainela & Sutela 1994). By mid-1993, inflation had
already been reduced to a reasonably low level, so this was not a case of
introducing a currency board in the midst of an economic crisis. So why was
the currency board adopted? Part of the reason may have been the success
of Estonian currency board. It had been in operation for over 18 months and
had served Estonia and its economic reforms quite well. Part of the reason
may have been a genuine desire to solve the time inconsistency problem of
the monetary policy. The Lithuanian public sector had a deficit of 3.3% of
GDP in 1993. In 1994, the deficit grew to 5.5%. Introducing a currency board,
which prevents lending to the government, removed the temptation to use the
central bank to finance the deficit. Deficit financing would have eventually
led to higher inflation. Having a currency board forced the public sector to
finance its deficit from other, non-inflationary sources. Lithuania continued to
have high deficits in 1995 and 1996 (4.5% of GDP in both years). In this
sense currency board may have prevented high inflation in Lithuania. How-
ever, at least de jure, the Bank of Lithuania is as independent as the Bank of
Latvia, so perhaps also the Lithuanian central bank could have attained equally
good results concerning inflation without a currency board system.30
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Measured by indicators other than inflation, Lithuania has not fared so
well. The country‘s competitiveness has eroded more rapidly than that of the
other two Baltic countries. From 1993 to 1998, the D-Mark-based unit labor
costs in manufacturing had risen by 180% in Estonia, 131% in Latvia, but
326% in Lithuania (EBRD 1999). One explanation for this difference be-
tween, say, Estonia and Lithuania can probably be found in the different speed
with which the restructuring of industries and companies has progressed.
This large increase in unit labor costs may also help explain Lithuania’s large
current account deficit.
Additional evidence on the credibility of Baltic currency boards can be
gleaned from interest rate differentials. Charts 4.4a and 4.4b show the
interbank rates from Estonia and Lithuania and the corresponding rates for
the D-Mark and the US dollar. The Bank of Lithuania started to calculate
daily interbank rates from the beginning of 1999, and this data can be used to
illustrate the large gap between interest rates in Lithuania and US. For Esto-
nia we use the monthly average for one month Talibor rate from the beginning
of 1997 to mid-1999. From both charts we can see that the interest rate
spreads became quite small at times, but in times of uncertainty in the global
financial markets the spreads widen substantially. While this mainly reflects
the inherent riskiness of Baltic banks, it also must reflect to some extent the
less-than-perfect credibility of the domestic currencies.
Chart 4.4a One-month Vilibor and USD Euromarket rates, %
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At the moment Lithuania is in process of abandoning its currency board. The
Bank of Lithuania has announced that it will give up the currency board and
adopt monetary policy based on more traditional central bank model. The
Bank of Lithuania has already introduced some monetary policy instruments,
but the litas monetary base is still 100% backed by foreign currency reserves.
Details of this gradual shift are spelled out in the Bank of Lithuania (1997),
which states that Lithuania is giving up its currency board to be better able to
react to problems in the financial sector. Other reasons for giving up the
currency board include a desire to be able to sterilize capital inflows and
generally influence economic development through monetary policy. In this
regard, it is quite interesting that the Bank of Lithuania has announced that
they will not give up thegra system of fixed exchange rate, even though they
may switch to pegging to the euro or a euro-dollar basket. It remains to be
seen whether Lithuania will be as successful as Latvia in maintaining a fixed
exchange without a currency board. Here one should remember that for ap-
proximately the last two years, the Bank of Latvia has maintained the ratio of
currency reserves to the monetary base at over 100%.
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5 Concluding remarks
Currency boards in the Baltic countries have been used successfully in a)
gaining rapid credibility for economic policies (or at least national currencies)
in a situation of severe economic turmoil and b) preventing monetary expan-
sion (and thus inflation) in excess of the increase in the foreign currency
reserves by committing the domestic policymakers to a simple monetary rule.
However, merely introducing a currency board as an exchange rate ar-
rangement is not enough to achieve stable economic environment and growth
in the medium and long term. A currency board works best as a part of a
comprehensive reform package (albeit often the most credible part of the
package). Currency board arrangements are typically difficult to change and
this enhances its credibility as long as the other parts of the reform package
are perceived to be in place.
A currency board requires reasonably tight fiscal policy. As the monetary
authority cannot extend credit to the government, possible deficits must be
financed from the capital markets, which means the government must be
perceived as solvent. Sound public finances have been difficult to achieve in
many transition economies as they often require that some interest groups in
the society lose, at least in the short term. In the Baltic countries, the fiscal
deficits have so far been fairly small, especially in Estonia. (See Annex.)
Currency boards also require sound financial systems. If the banking sec-
tor is weakly capitalized or poorly supervised, the capital flows associated
with currency board can endanger its systemic stability. All Baltic countries
have experienced banking crises, but the stability of the banking system itself
has been maintained, often with the financial support of the authorities. For-
eign banks presently own significant shares in the largest Baltic banks, which
should increase the stability and credit-worthiness of these banks and the
whole banking sectors. Both the fiscal adjustment and financial sector stabil-
ity are supported by structural reforms in the economy and society at large,
and in this regard the Baltic countries have been very successful. Their re-
form efforts (broadly understood) have been consistent, and they begun early
on in the transition process. The case of Latvia also illustrates that it is possi-
ble to reach stabilization and at least somewhat stable economic growth with-
out a currency board, provided the exchange rate and monetary policies enjoy
credibility and economic policies are otherwise growth inducing.33
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So far none of the countries that adopted currency boards after Hong
Kong have given up the arrangement. Hong Kong’s currency board has been
in place for nearly two decades (although not without changes), so it appears
that currency boards can be sustained for a prolonged period of time. In the
future both Estonia and Lithuania will presumably exit from the currency
board arrangement. Both countries have stated their desire to become mem-
bers of the European Union and eventually to join the monetary union, i.e.
give up their own currencies. The Bank of Lithuania (1997) announced Lithua-
nia’s aim to exit the arrangement and outlined a timetable for the exit process.
However, the recent uncertainty in emerging markets has apparently made
the Lithuanian authorities somewhat more cautious in their approach to the
exit from their currency board arrangement, so the exit has been postponed.
The repegging of the litas will probably occur in the year 2000. This post-
ponement and the large external and internal imbalances in the Lithuanian
economy have prompted some commentators to question the present cur-
rency peg. Estonian authorities have chosen a different approach. Their in-
tention is to preserve the currency board arrangement until EU membership.
It is felt that the credibility of economic policies would be endangered if the
currency board would be abandoned. In light of the recent experiences of
Lithuania, this approach makes considerable sense.34
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Notes
* I wish to thank Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Tuomas Komulainen, Jouko Rautava, Steven
Rosefielde, Pekka Sutela, and especially Ratna Sahay for their comments on a previ-
ous version of this paper. All remaining errors and omissions are naturally mine.
1 Some authors maintain that a system with reserve deposits and thus some room for
discretionary monetary policy is not a currency board at all. See, for example, Hanke
et al (1993).
2 Estonia maintained some restrictions on the capital account for the first 18 months
of the currency board. Residents were not allowed to open new foreign currency
deposits in the Estonian banks, see Korhonen (1996).
3 A basket approach was suggested in Lithuania (Camard 1996).
4 The present discussion on currency reforms draws heavily on Lainela & Sutela
(1994).
5 Monetary overhang was the result of forced saving during the Soviet era. House-
holds and companies couldn’t increase their consumption at the same rate as their
money holdings increased. Prices were fixed, so excess demand couldn’t be elimi-
nated by raising prices, i.e. open inflation. On monetary overhang in Russia, see e.g.
Rautava (1993). For more detailed account of the early Russian reforms, see e.g.
Sutela (1993) and Koen & Marrese (1995).
6 See Hanke et al (1993).
7 There are still restrictions on foreigners buying real estate.
8 Although Latvia has never had a currency board, we believe it is useful to examine
also its economic performance. It is natural to compare Latvia and its two Baltic
neighbors with currency boards, as all three countries are small, very open, and have
been parts of a same country for a better part of this century.
9 These results must be regarded as preliminary, because we simply do not have
many observations from countries with currency boards.
10 I use here the variable “Money” from International Monetary Fund’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics. This item is equal to the currency outside banks and
demand deposits at the banks, i.e. it corresponds to M1. For Russia we have used the
currency in circulation.
11 See Äimä (1998) for an assessment of the independence of the Baltic central
banks. In the case of Estonia and Lithuania the currency board arrangement require
a great deal of independence for monetary authority, but Latvia seems to be at least
as independent as the other two Baltic central banks.38
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12 There are obviously difficulties in compressing complex economic, social and
legal conditions into single numbers, but it is our opinion that these indicators give
a tolerable picture of the relative ranking of different countries in their progress.
13 For an account of early experiences of bank restructuring in transition economies,
see Borish et al (1995).
14 Requiring a two-thirds majority of parliament.Rupinder Singh – Juhani Laurila.39
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Annex
Macroeconomic variables in the three Baltic countries
Estonia
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998*
GDP change, % -14.2 -8.5 -1.8 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.0
Average inflation, % 1076 89.8 48.0 29.0 23.0 11.0 6.5
Current account balance, % of GDP n.a. 1.3 -7.1 -4.7 -9.2 -12.0 -8.6
General government balance, % of GDP -0.8 -0.7 1.3 -1.2 -1.5 2.3 -0.3*
Nominal GDP, bn USD 1.04 1.64 2.28 3.54 4.37 4.63 5.19
Source EBRD (1999) and national statistical authorities, * estimates by EBRD (1999)
Latvia
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP change, % -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.6
Average inflation, % 951.2 108.0 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.4 4.7
Current account balance, % of GDP 1.7 6.9 -2.4 -3.6 -7.0 -6.4 -11.5
General government balance, % of GDP -0.8 0.6 -4.1 -3.5 -1.4 1.3 0.1*
Nominal GDP, bn USD 1.5 1.69 3.65 4.43 5.13 5.64 6.40
Source EBRD (1999) and national statistical authorities, * estimates by EBRD (1999)
Lithuania
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP change, % -37.7 -17.1 -11.3 2.3 4.7 7.3 5.1
Average inflation, % 1020.5 410.4 72.1 39.5 24.7 8.9 5.1
Current account deficit, % of GDP 10.6 -3.3 -2.2 -10.3 -9.3 -10.3 -12.1
General government balance, % of GDP 0.5 -4.3 -5.4 -4.5 -4.0 -2.4 -6.0*
Nominal GDP, bn USD 1.91 2.66 4.71 5.94 7.89 9.59 10.69
Source EBRD (1999) and national statistical authorities, * estimates by EBRD (1999)BOFIT Discussion Papers
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